The paper describes the main characteristics of the 2006 Brazilian Presidential elections. It explores two defining traits of this elections: the interplay between how retrospective economic voting and views towards corruption affected vote volatility and the final result of the election. The paper concludes by pointing out implications of the current elections to the strengthening of democracy in Brazil.
In this article we explore how the management of governing coalitions and attributes of the dynamics of the conflict between and within governing and opposition coalitions affect obstructionist movements in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies from 1991 to 2010. Obstructionist movements are operationalized by the percentage of monthly roll call votes related to procedural requirements that delay decisions on legislative proposals. We find that the proportionality in the distribution of ministerial posts reduces obstruction in minority coalitions. In larger coalitions, this type of incentive has little effect in reducing obstructionist moves. Smaller, more cohesive, and better managed governing coalitions are more capable than oversized coalitions of diminishing problems for decision making in the Chamber of Deputies./n ; En este artículo se explica cómo la gestión de la coalición de gobierno y los atributos de la dinámica del conflicto entre e intra-coaliciones, tanto del gobierno como de la oposición, afectan a la incidencia de movimientos de obstrucción en la Cámara de los Diputados brasileña entre 1991 y 2010. Los movimientos de obstrucción son operacionalizados a través del porcentaje de votaciones nominales mensuales relativas a requerimientos procedimentales que de alguna forma retrasan la decisión sobre una propuesta legislativa. Se encuentra que la proporcionalidad en la distribución de cargos en los ministerios es eficiente a la hora de reducir la obstrucción en coaliciones menores. En coaliciones mayores, este tipo de incentivo tiene poco efecto para reducir movimientos obstruccionistas. Coaliciones de gobierno menores, más unidas y mejor administradas, son más eficientes que alianzas hinchadas para aminorar los problemas de toma de decisión en la Cámara de los Diputados./n ; Dans cet article, ils s'agit d'expliquer comment la gestion de la coalition du gouvernement et les attributs de la dynamique du conflit entre et intra-coalitions, aussi bien du gouvernement comme de l'opposition, affectent l'incidence des mouvements d'obstruction dans la Chambre des députés brésilienne entre 1991 et 2010. Les mouvements d'obstruction sont opérationnalisés à travers le pourcentage de votes nominaux mensuels relatifs aux exigences des procédures qui, en quelque sorte, retardent la décision sur la proposition législative. On s'aperçoit que la proportionnalité dans la distribution des postes dans les ministères est efficace quant il s'agit de réduire l'obstruction dans des coalitions plus petites. Dans des plus grandes coalitions, ce type d'incitation a peu d'effet pour réduire les mouvements obstructionnistes. Des coalitions de gouvernement plus grandes, plus unies et mieux administrées, sont plus efficaces que des alliances stériles pour réduire les problèmes de prise de décision de la Chambre des députés.
This article seeks to understand multiparty cabinets in presidential systems. The article applies theories developed for parliamentary systems to the case of Brazil and uses ministerial endorsements of executive bills to test whether multiparty cabinets are anchored in an office or a policy‐seeking compact. The analysis shows that participation in policy making within the cabinet is highly concentrated in technical ministries and ministries occupied by the president's party. The analysis also shows that ideological heterogeneity is a significant predictor of ministerial endorsement, indicating that under conditions of ideological proximity, presidential cabinets are able to share policy‐making responsibilities.
This article addresses central issues in multiparty presidential systems: the functioning of legislative coalitions and the dynamics of legislative conflict. Since electoral competition has elements of both positive‐sum (increase in common support) and zero‐sum (exact division of the support) qualities, lawmaking in coalitional systems presents unique challenges. Using legislative data from Brazil, we examine how coalition management and unity affect legislative delay and obstructionism. We find, among others, that: (1) coalition management is pivotal for both faster legislative approval and less obstructionism, but its effect depends on coalition size; and (2) cohesive opposition impedes the legislative process.
Why run for reelection when the logic and incentives of the political system leave no doubt that running for other offices is a better option? This paper focuses on the factors that influence both the choice of career and the electoral success of those who run for reelection and those who attempt to obtain other offices, using Brazil as a case study, a typically fragmented, multiparty environment with a strong executive. We argue that legislators run for reelection because it is the safest bet for them. The probability of winning is higher for those who attempt reelection than for those running for any other office. Because static ambition is conditioned by election results and not by the intrinsic desire to develop a career in the legislative branch, career paths do not necessarily lead to improvements in legislative professionalization and institutionalization. This finding contradicts theories that relate career paths to legislative institutionalization. Adapted from the source document.
In this paper we bring together institutional, contextual, & behavioral perspectives in a comprehensive model that explores determinants of executive & legislative approval based on economic performance in Brazil & Chile. Our main question is, do voters attribute responsibility for the state of the economy to their representatives in the Legislative Branch as they apparently do to officeholders in the Executive Branch? We search for answers to this question with an eye on how active the distinct branches of government are in economic policy-making & voters' levels of political sophistication. Our main hypothesis is that less sophisticated voters will blame politicians indiscriminately for the state of the economy, independent of how influential each branch of government is on economic policy. More sophisticated voters will better discern the role each branch plays in economic policy-making & will not blame representatives in the Legislative Branch for the state of the economy when Congress is not active in economic policy-making. The cases of Brazil & Chile under Cardoso & Lagos offer the perfect opportunity to test this hypothesis, which is confirmed by our data. Adapted from the source document.